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1, Introduction 
Vie past three decades have witnessed Ule growth of a voluminous literature on 
tenancy arid reIated institutions. Problems of resource use efficiency, role of markets, 
inter-linkages between markets and the emergence of institutions have all emerged as 
major issues.' However, an aspect that has not received adequate attention in the past 
relates to the role of irrigation in relation to tenancy. Part of the reason could be tlre 
fact that in East Asian and Western European contexts (to which is related a lot of 
work on tenancy) there is no moisture constraint and therefore irrigation does not have 
the status of a leading input. However, in South Asia the incidence and form of 
tenancy are influenced by rainfdl and irrigation. Viougli past studies have recognised 
the relevance of it, mostly it has been taken as one of the explanatory variables In 
regressions? These studies though interesting are far from adequate in bringing out 
the process ihmugh which irrigation shapes the working of !and lease market. 
Another issue that has vexed researchers is the evolution of institutions. A 
recent summary by Bardhan brings out the state of confusion: 
"The Marxist, CDAW? and imperfect infoirnation theories nre 
all equdiy murky oti the mechanism through which new institutions and 
property rights emerge. All three sets of theory, in explaining historical 
transition, show how new institutions will serve the interests of economic 
progress and old institutions are a hindrance and are 'ripe' for a change - 
but as if ripeness is all: as if there is no need to specify a predictable 
mode1 of the process of change". 
(Bardharr, 1989, p. 6). 
Especially important in the context of South Asia is the evolution of tenlancy in a 
111 a recent fivelopment a strong reaction llss come about to the treatment of 
tenancy independently of the labur market. Hayami and Otsuka put it as: "separate 
analysis of land and labour contracts have resulted in muclr theoretical confusion a$ 
well as questionable interpretations of empirical data especially those drawing 
inferences about the relative efficiency of alternative contracts" (Hayami and Otsuh, 
1993, p.2) and argue for a unified treatment In their cntl~usiasm they fail to set out 
the limits of unified treatment. Unified treatment can tlo t be a general requirement; it 
may be relevant under specific conditions. 
This paper seeks to address these three issues in an i~~te~onnected way. The 
paper begins by setting out the facets of irrigation uncertainty in a surface irrigation 
system of long standing and then establishes a relationship between the changing 
idgation situation and the incidence and form of tenancy. The usefulness of a unified 
treatment in uoderstanding the various dimensions of tenancy in a basically su bsistenea 
paddy cultivation is then brought out. Jn the very next step i t  was shown that such a 
unified treatment is not essential for understanding tenancy in cash crop (banana) 
eul tivation. 
The data for tllis study was collected from village surveys conducted in 
Kanyakamari district in Tamil Nndu, An imprtant feature of this district is the 
significant variations in the ago-ecological conditions. Tile district has high rainfall 
zones sinlilar to Kernla. There is also a large part of the district resembIing the. 
conditions in the semi-arid regions in India. The district has a long history of' 
irrigation! Before this century tl~ere existed in the district an interlinked system of' 
tat~ks nlld diversioi~ weirs for irrigation. From the early part of this century, then has1 
been growth of canal irrigation. During the recent past the district has been witnessing' 
acute scarcity of irrigation water and it has been felt more in the lower reaches thw 
in the upper reaches. In order to understand ltow tlre changes in the availability of 
irrigation has influenced the land lease market we undertook case studies of four' 
villages: two from the upper reaches (UR) Kotlianalloor and Kadukkm and two fmi~ 
of all the housel~olds was carried O L I ~ ,  foEIowed by the ide~ttificntton of the tenant 
househotds. From them ~vere coEiected data on not c113y i!:e zurree; teilnrlcy, br;t also 
on the tenancy history. 
The paper is organised into SIX sections. Seckiart 2 providcs 2 brief analysis of 
the quantum of i-airlfall and goes to show that irrigaticrr~ h x  sufPfl:fed sincc  he ealy 
1970s. Section 3 using the: dala fmm rwo UR villages and twv LR viIhges attempt to 
relate tllc shift fronn fixcd re111 to zllasc cropping 10 the irrigatio;~ rn~icer:ait~ty it1 the LR 
villages. The lascfulness cf a ur~ified treatment of laed a d  fabour markets is brouglrt 
out in tile section. The various ditrienstons of fixed .en t iir j?r?dd y cu!ti;rai:'-rrra - uariatiot~ 
in rent across the villages, across plots within a village, a c r w  differea~i size cIass of 
leased in land etc. - are golre into in Section 4. Section 5 turns to the terms of tenancy 
ia one OF the UR vi2lages where baoaa cu!ti.ratior~ is widc~yread. While section 3 
brings out the relevance OF a unified trcat~ncnt, Section 5 clearly points to its 
limitiltio~~s. Section 6 Is the conctusio~l, 
2. Rainfall and Irriplation 
Kanydcumui district, fiillil~g witllia a !ow rainfiill zone has a lorjg history nf 
irrigated agriculture. Historically, the ir-rigatinn :iy:teilrn consisted sf a ~aetwork of tariks 
aild diversion-weirs, This century has witnessed a significarlt clla~ge in the 
characteristic of the systenr; twge reservoirs were superilnposed oti tire syszem. In 
1906, the Pahipara dam was co~nmissioned; in 1956, rhe Perii~r;haili dam was cdded; 
a11d ill 1964, the Clailtar-Partilna~~iki~l scheme it~cseased the storage capaciiy further. 
With the constructj~n of reservoirs, the tanks Ilavc goile into disuse, llleir numbers 
l~avirlg come down from 3045 itt 1935 to 15 f 3 in 1962. 
Tunlir~g to the irat.ilai.ioris il! tli-r: rjltar~i;:.ria of a ~ : ~ r ~ a l  ' ~ i r ~ f i ~ f i P ! I  dul-ia~g t!le Inst 90 
years or so, i t  is evi i le~~t  !laat !I~ere I1:trl heen sor?~ew!lut of a cyclical bel~;tviour (Table 
1). 113 terms of dcvi:lfioas frtlti~ il!e !ong-run :tvct.;:ze, d~i: rail1 f i r  t f wa:; rieficierlt by over 
I5 per cent during 1301 to 1915. This was foliowed i:y ii) to 20 per cent above 
tlverdge rainfdll duri tlg 1 Y 16 to 1936. The period 1937 to 1978 witnessed near normal 
rainfall followed by over 15 per cent deficiency beyond 1978. 
Tabla 1 : Rainfall in Kanyakumari District 
Years Seven year annua l  Deviation f ram 
average (mms) the normal 
................................................................. 
1902-1908 1160.7 - 1 4 . 9 9  
1909-1915 1121.3 -17.88 
1916-1922 1518.1 +11.18 
1923-1929 1650.7 +20.89 
1930-1936 1520.3 +11.35 
1937-1943, 1399.5 +2 .50  
1944-1959 1405.3 +2.92 
1951-1957 1300.8 -4.73 
1958-1964 1434.1 +5.03 
1965-1971 1438.8 + 5 . 3 8  
1972-1978 1341.8 -1.73 
1979-1985 1173.9 -14.03 
1986-1989 1109.2 -18.76 
------------------------------------------------------------*"--- 
Overall 1365.4 - 
1----------1----------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Tamilnadu Statistical Abstracts (Various issues) Govt. 
of Tamilnadu, Madras. 
Note: Deviation from the Normal is defined as 
(Seven Year Averase - Overall Averase) 1 0 0  
Overall Average 
The deficiency in rainfall has given rise to lower release of water from the 
reservoirs (Table 2). During a period of seven years from 1 980-8 1 to 1986-87, the 
release of water as a percetltage of yield was close to 100 only in one year (1981-82); 
during the rest of the years the deficiency was between 22 to 44 per cent of yield. 
Fable 2 : Water Release as a Percentage of Yield 
................................................................. 
Year Pechipara Perunchani Total 
I - - -C- -_- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -w- - -m-- -"  
1980-81 52 60 56 
1981-82 75 138 97 
1982-83 7 9  70 75 
1983-84 53 66 58 
1984-85 78 78 78 
1985-86 75 77 75 
1986-87 49 102 68 
................................................................. 
Source: Government of Tamilnadu, Tamilnadu : An Economic 
Appraisal (various issues) . 
As the quantum of water release is not known before sowing, the area sown 
mqy not come down in anticipatio~ of a deficient raissFdl1. A I ~ Q  as the water released 
may not be equitably distributed over the ayacut, the deficiency in water release may 
not directly get translated into n shadall in the area harvested to m a  sown. Further, 
various methods of allocating water may be tried during periods of scarcity and 
supplen~entary sources may be exploited. Thus, an indication OF the extent of water 
scarcity may be had by the intensity of use of stappiemerrtary sources. The dam from 
the two UR and two LR  villages showed that the use sf supplementary sources was 
absent in the former two villages, In the LR villages, their use showed a wide variation 
(Table 3). 
Table 3 1 WtiPiaatPon of Wells and Rendu as Supplementary 6ourcas 
- - - - -_-  _ + - - _ _ -  -_--------------- ----.-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - -  - - + - -  ----------- 
Tellan t s Owr:er cultivator 
Season I Season XI Season I Seas011 I1 
Percentage o f  Tenants 
Puchasing water A z  5 4 , 5 5  18.1B 2 8 . 5 7  2 4 . 4 9  
Pv 9 . 5 2  9.52 14.28 11.90 
Average Hours for w?lich 
pumped A z  12.00 , 13.67 13.46 12 ,54  
Pv * * t * 
Average cost illcu rred 
per reporting tenant/ Az 191-66 256.33 262.50 302.80 
owner cultivator Pv 157 - 5 0  4 2  . S O  3 2 4 . 0 0  252 .40  
--------------------------*-----------------------*---------------------------  
Source : Field Survcy . 
Note : * Cannot he computed beeausc diverse sources and lifting devices have 
been used.  Electric motors, o i l  motors, hand pumping and low l i f t  
using vessels have hoen used. So a comparable unit of measure could 
not be deviced. 
While in Az, in  Season 1, 55 per cent of the tenants were using such sources the 
incidence was only 29 per cent anlong tlre ~ w ~ ~ e r  cultivators; but in Seas011 I1 the 
percentages were IS sod 25 respectively. In Pv., a! tl~ougll the percentages were lligller 
among owner cultivtitoss (1 2 to 14) compared to tenants (lo), there was not much 
vruiatioil between seasons. The cost incurred per reporting housel~ald also showed 
considerable variation between seasons, across villages and between tenants and owner 
cultivators. It may be cozcluded that Az is the rnore seriously affected compared to Pv. 
In sum, even dlari~rg severe overall irrigatio~~ deficiency UR villages remain 
unaffected, LR villages get affected with varying intensities. 
3. Irrigation. Uncertainty and T W ~ C Y  
In the literature or1 tenancy it is often wgued that uncertainty md the associated 
risk gives rise to various farms of tenancy. The issue of tenurial forms in reIation to 
the specific irrigation uncertainty is taken up in this section. 
The incidence of  tenancy, defined as the percentage of households leasing in to 
the total, showed significant variation across the sample villages. It is fairly high in the 
two UR villages and low in the two LR villages (Table 4). But the average size of 
leased in land itself had little to do with the incidence of tenancy; it varied with the 
average land-man ratio for rlle taIuk as a whole. The average size of leased in land 
varied from 44 cents to 136 cents i t 1  the two UR villages and from 37 cents to 94 cents 
in the two LR villages. It is evident from the data that wherever there is irrigation 
uncertainty the incidence of tenancy is low. 
Tabla 4: Tenancy - Incidence and Size of Leased in Land 
Village Incidence Average size of 
leased in land 
( %  (cents) 
................................................. 
Kothanalloor 3 3  4 4  
Kadukkara 3 1  136 
Pattarivilai 5 37 
Azhagappapuram 10 94 
Land-man ratio 
f o r  the taluk, 
1981 
(cents/person) 
---------------- 
21 
43  
21 
30  
Source: F i e l d  Survey and District Census Hand Book, 1991. 
Turning to the form of tenancy of land under paddy, in both the UR villages all 
the households reported fixed rent tenancy. Between the LR villages, Pv reported 89 
per cent fixed rent tenancy and 4 1 per cent share tenancy and Az reported 64 per cent 
share tenancy and the rest under fixed rent. If the percentage of housel~olds using 
supplementary sources of irrigation (Table 3) is a measure of the irrigation uncertainty 
then, the incidence of share tenancy is related to it. 
lnn rsder to calject infornlntioat on the process of clla~lge 
from the currcnt tenancy; and (ii} in case of acute water scarcityJclrougl~t he rent rule 
foIlowed. As to (i) above, in Pv for d~e  two tenants (out of 18) w l ~ a  reported share 
tenancy the cumen t tenancy was their initial tenancy. For one of them the tenancy was 
less than one year old at the t i m ~  of the survey. The second has been a tenant for over 
70 y e m  and for t11e endre duration the dim hes h i 1  50 per cent. In Az, of the I I, 
eight had been tenan:s fos less than tetl years, and six out of the eight had &om 
tenants only during the Inst five years. Tlrc ini!i:d te1larrcy OF tire eight was distributed 
as three fixed arid five sl~larc~ OF the tl~rce o:le 112s becorne a share teraant durilsg the 
fast ten ycars. Of the three te!lants (out of 1 1) wtrose initial tenat~cies were over SO 
I: 
years old, two were ,fixed and one (ieosing iri te~~iple land) was share tennrlcy. Out of 
the two one had secured share tenaacy in the current tenancy. OveralI the picture is 
one of moving from fixed to s h a ~  tenancy in tile recent past owing to the irrigation 
uncertainty. Such n ~novcmelit from fixed to sfaare tmancy i s  itltetlse in Az where elle 
ilxigation uncerlais~iy is also intense, 
The i~~fortnatioll on rent mlc during rirougl~t ugairl brings out the relation 
bettlvee~r irajgatiorr uncertainty and s b m  aenatlcy. As is evjdcut from Table 5, the UR 
vi Iiages reported fairly si nyIe rules. 1n Kn., there was no ~ncution of any change in the 
rde: if fhe yicld of paddy I;slll :illor! of  the rent the latter wi~s  demanded in cash. Only 
irl thee oi~t  cf 34 cases. the concessiut~ of payment rEuring clle next season was given, 
111 Kd, i i  lNiIs ;\ striijglli 5 0  pet. cent of yield in rase of drougllts Between the two LR 
viIlnges, in A, i t  was prcdorl;inantly the 50 per cent rule; thcre were two cases where 
no rerlt was rlernnslded and in  one case fixed sent !lad to be paid if the yield was 
greater than tlre reiat. 111 Pv, wlael-e irrigation uncertainty was not 3s jnterise as in 4, 
there werc a largcr number of teaants (9120) reporting IIU rent or lower rent rule in case 
of' drougllt; but ~ltcre were at1 equnlIy !rrrge nutllber (G,Q0) reporting h e  rent rule of 
payment in cast? after tl~c Itawest or paymerlt during (!!c next season. It may then be 
i~~ferred that wl~creves irrigitiont uncertal~!.y cxisted tlrcre was a proviso for 50 per cent 
ient in a drought year. As tlre uucertai tlty increased this proviso in the rule became the 
Tabla 5 t Rent Rule in Caea  of Drought 
Number reporting 
Kn Kd Az Pv 
50 per cent of yield 
No rent 
Lower rent 
Fixed rent i f  
y ie lc l  > rent 
Sixecl rent 
To ba pa id  in cash 
To be paid next season 
Total 
Following Table 5 ,  it is appropriate to discuss an issue wllic h has attracted a lot 
of attention in the literature, namely the tenant reneging the contract. When the rent 
rule has so many provisions, knowledge of the actual yield from the plot becomes 
absolutely essential. How does the lessor ensure it? In answering this question the point 
raised by Otsuka et nl, op,cit., namely a unified treatment of land and labour contractsts, 
becomes relevant. In all the f ~ u r  villages surveyed, tlse harvesting and threshing 
operations were carrid out by gangs of labour and the wage payment is in paddy. 
Though the wage rule itself varied within a village across plots as well as across 
villages, (A detailed discussion of this issue may be found in Nair and Nmyana, 1990) 
what was common in all the villages was the following: a fixed number of ~ o t t a h P  
of paddy per acre plus a share for every kothh of yield over a certain minimum had 
to be paid as wages. Such a wage rule ensured two things: (i) yield is accumte1y 
measured and became comlnan knowledge, and lhe output is amassed in one place 
(mostly tl~resl~ing yard) at some point of time after harvesting and threshing. This 
would simply Ieave no scope for reneging tlie contract. 
A related issue is one of ensuring adequate application of inputs and labour 
under sl~rrrecropping, In the 1 i terature three possibilities we discussed: 
(i) landlord stipulates levels of input use and closely monitors; 
(ii) landlord shares input costs; and 
(iii) puts the threat of termination of tenancy. 
Taslim (1992) ernpliasised the third of the above. Our data (Tiable 6) seems to confirm 
Taslirn going by the fiiairly Iligh proportion of tenancies of shorter durations in tile LR 
villages. But the pattern could dso be because of the unwillingness of tlae tenants to 
lease in land in the; LR vitlages in EEle face of irrigation uncertainty, The fact that over 
70 per cent of the tenants in Az had been tenants for less than ten yew seems to 
suggest the latter. 
Table 6 r Dimtribution (%I of Tenancy by Duration 
l_ - - ~ - - - l - - - - l - ~ l - r - - - - - ~ - - - ~ d - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ -  
Duration in years Percentage of Tenants Reparting 
-----.-----1--31--------*--------------------- 
Kn Kd Pv Az 
Below 3 - 2.94 0 23 -82 9 - 0 9  
3 -  6 26.47 23.08 3 3 . 3 3  36.36 
7 - 10 20.59  48 .?2 9 . 5 2  9.09 
11 - 15 35.29 1 5 . 3 9  0 27.27 
IS* 1 4 . 7 1  ' 13.82 3 3 . 3 3  18.18 
---C-I--I---I---.-C----------I-------d------------------------"------ 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
----C-------r--l---------------------------------------------w--- 
4. Fixed rent naddy cultivation 
This section takes up the question of fixed rent paddy cultivation. As elaborated 
in the previous section, in one of the LR vilktges fixed tent tenancy has dmst 
disappeared. Hence for the discussion of this section only three vilhges, two UU 
villages and one LR village, nre considered, 
As i s  evider~t from Tabic 7, the avenge am~uaf rent (per acre) varied from 19.44 
kottahs in KN t~ 13,26 kottailtls in Kd. The variatio~l in rent across the villages is 
proportionate ta the variatiorl in lElz wnud yidd levels in these villages. The yield 
level varied fmrn 50,08 kottahs in Kn to 32.71 koftal~s in Pv. The argument tllilt the 
variation in rent is proportionate to tlie yield levels across villages gets confirmed when 
the ratio of rent to yield are computed. The average for die t h e  villages did not show 
much of a variation lying between 040 and 0.44, 
Table 7 t Rent, Yield and S i r e  in Paddy Cultivation 
Vi 1 lages 
Kn Kd Pv 
Mean 
Mean 
SD 
cv 
Mean 
SP 
CY 
Mean 
Rent (kottahs 1 
19.44- 13 -26 
Yield (kottahs) 
50 . o r  34 .05  
Size of Leased in Land (Cents} 
49.23 165.55 35.64  
Source : F i e l d  Survey 
Note: The average size of leased in land shown here is different from that 
shown in Table 4 because only land under paddy is considered here. 
CV is in percentages 
It is pertinent to note here that the yield levels are not higher in the UR villages 
compared to the LR villages. Altl~ough it is significantly higher in one of tile UR 
villages, 50 kottahs in Kn, it is not so in the other UR village where it is only 
comparable to the level in the LR village. The observed differences in the yield levels 
cannot be explained by the irrigation uncertainty but by the rates of adoption of high 
yielding varieties (HYVs) which are not entirely governed by irrigation. The adoption 
rate is over 85 per cent in Kn in the two seasons across tenants and owner cultivators, 
but is below 10 per cent in Kd. In Pv, the adoption rate varied between 35 and 50 per 
cent in the two seasons between owner cultivators and tenants. The observed adoption 
rate in Kd cannot be explained by the yield differential between HYVs and local 
varieties (LVs). But the yield differential does explain the difference in the rate of 
adoption between Kn and Pv. In Kn, the yield differential varied between 1 10 to 148 
per cent and the rate of adoption was high. But the yield differential was not 
significantly different for the two varieties in Pv - the yield differential varied between 
60 ta 1 14 per cent - and the adoption rate was also lower? 
Taking up tile qvestioll of the variation of rents within the villages across plots, 
it  may be seen that the variation measured in terms of CV was &lie lowest in Kn; it was 
higher in Kd and Pv. What explains such variation? It may be observed that the 
variation in yield is high ill KII. I11 the face of a fairly high variation in yield if the 
variatio~i in rent is low tllen, i t  implies4 illat rents do not vary with yield. This gets 
confirmed when the CV of the ratio of rent to yield is computed. It was very high for 
Kn a d  very low for Pv. It may be that rents ga up arid stabilise at a certain level 
given the assured irrigation and use of IiYVs, as in Kn but do vary with yield when 
tliere is irrigation uficeriainty and high variation in yiekI. 
In order to test t!le relatiomship of rent with yield and size of knsed in lmd, 
lillear ~.egressio~~s werc run using OIdS metllod. The results are shown ia Tablc 8. It is 
evidellt tllal in KH in::.rilh assured irrigation and high Etlciderlce of tenancy the hndowaers 
we able to in~pose higher rents or1 s~natler tenants who ue mostly landless agricultural 
labourers. This is rrot to bc obscavd in Kd where the average size of leased in land 
was fairly high, or in Fv wllere in tfae face of irrigation uncertainty the incidence of 
tellaricy itself is low. Jlence, in bath Kd and Pv rent i s  positively related to yield, 
where size of Ieased in lilr~d itself played no significant role. In Kn it was the size of 
leased ilr laud which played a significant role in the determination of rent, being higher 
for small Iease holders, 
TahXe 8 r Regroanion of Pent on Y i s i l d  and Size 
--=-------------------------------------.-------.------------------ 
Village Constant C o e f f i c i c n t a a f  A d j .  R~ Ma. a£ 
Yield Size observations 
_ -C1-1-3*1~-1-~~--__-l----ll-l--IC-l--l---------~-~~-*-------~-~ 
Kn 21.47 -0 .05 0.26 13 
21.962) * 
Note: t values are shown within parenthesis. 
Y i e l d  and rent are in kottahs, size in cents. 
Overall, it may be concluded that irrigation uncertainty plays an important role 
in detennir~irlg tlla pntill rates, But tlre role itself is mediated through the incidence of 
tenancy and averqBe size of leased in Iand. In a situation of assured irrigation, when 
the size is  small and the incidence of tenancy is higli rents tend to be higher for the 
smaller ones. This gets altered when the size of 'leased in land itself is high. A130 
when there is irrigation uncertainty and the incidence of tenancy is low even if the 
average size is small, rents tend to move with yield. 
5. Fixed rent, incentives and banana cultivation 
It has often been argued (Rao, 1971) that fixed rent tenancy is an incentive 
system "permitting the tenants to capture the returns expected in consequence of their 
decision-makiiig". Such itlce~ltives llave taken the tenants in one of the UR villages, 
namely Kn with assured irrigation, to cultivate banana, for which there has emerged 
an ever increasing market in the neighbouring state of Kerala. What new features have 
been introduced into the terms a ~ ~ d  conditions of tella~lcy when the crop grown is 
banana? 
Among the four villages surveyed, banana cultivation on leased in land is 
reported to ar~y significant extent only in one sf the UR villages, namely Kn, with 36 
X]er cent of the area cultivated accounted for by it. The average size of leased in land 
for banana cu1tivatio11 is 36 cents compared to 49 cents for paddy cultivation (Table 
9). But the variation is much higher in the case of banana cultivation, CV being 110 
per cent, compared to 52 per cent for the land under paddy. 
Tebla 9 1 Size, Rent and Deposit  in Banana Cultivation 
.............................................................................. 
S i z e  Family Rent Deposit Rent for non- Size  of leased 
(cents) Labour (per acre) (per acre) deposit paying in land 
share tenants (cents) , 
Rs . Rs . 
-------------------*---------------------------------------------------------- 
Mean 36.08 61.08 3 9 5 7 . 0 4  2863.47 4330.00 15.56 
SD 39.51 3 4 . 8 5  1584.85  2002.15 1518.77 10.40 
CV ( % )  109.51 57.05 40.06 69.92 35.08  6 6 . 8 5  
Incidence - - - 6 5 . 3 8  - 34 .62  
A significalll ilsyect regarding banana cu1tivatioo is that tile share of fmnily 
4 '  labour in total llabour appt ied is very Iligh. The average share is 6 1 per cent with a CV 
of 57 per cent. Tl~c share of family labour (Ft) when regressed on the size of leased 
in land (in cents) gave tl~e following equation: 
FL . = 78.23 - 0.478 Size Adj; R~ = 0.29 
(2.56) (3.08)" No. of obsns = 25 
(t values we given within brackets) 
mius, the s h m  of FL is inversely related with the size of leased in Iand. The smdI 
tellants take to banatla cultivation wid1 a view to utilise ttreit family labour. Here it is 
important to note that Iliis cannot be done in paddy cultivatiolr because the operations 
are time bound and Iuit~py in nature. In banana cullivalion there exists considerable 
flexibility which is taken advantage of by households with family labour. 
In tlie case of Iand leased in for paddy cultivation the percentage of tenants with 
duration of lease M o w  three years was almost insignificant (Table 6). In Ute case of 
banana, less t l i a ~ ~  4 per cent oE tenslrlts reported indefinite duration; seven per cent a 
duration of two years and for the rest - almost 90 per cent - the duration was one year 
only. Tl~us, land for banana cultivation is leased out for one year only. 
The rent on the l ~ n d  leased for banana cultivation is to be paid in cash. The 
average relit per acre cmle to 3957 rupees per year wi tll a CV of 40 per cell t. This was 
about 30 per cent higher thaal the average rent for land leased in for paddy cultivation 
at tIlc ruti~lg price of paddy. In i t~e  case of paddy land, it was observed that relit was 
inversely related to the size of leased in Imd but no such relationdlip was observed in 
lIae case of banana. No stadstical reIatioaship was observed with size or output value; 
In the context of paddy cwItivatiorr the possibility of the tenant reneging on the 
contract was ruled out owing to the specificities of l~arvesting md tbreshir;g wage 
cotltrrrcts in existence in tlic area. But harvesting of Ginatla is not boulld by such 
specificities. The saIe of banana is n cotltrrlct entered into by dae tenant with a trader 
a i d  the price ansly not be known to others at all. Jn such a situation the Iandowner has 
no way of knowing the sale value of the outpur fmin t i ~ c  plot or ensuring timely 
payment of rent. In order to get out of such a situation a system of deposits has come 
into vogue in banana cultivation. A fixed su rn which is less tlian or equal to the rzntzl 
value is to be paid by rhe tellant six months aftcr plantilrg. This is quite comparable 
Lo the sewa reported by Moronka and Hayanli (1989) for a Javarlese village. 
The incidence of deposit is not PW per cent. Deposit i s  not collected from $1 
the tenants cultivating barnla. Only 65 per cent of the tenants reported paying a 
deposit and the average deposit was 2563 rupees per acre which was 76 per cent of the 
average recital value for the gmup (Table 9). Wle group n a  paying deposit accounted 
for 35 per cell t of the total tesanls'and the average size of leased in land for the gmup 
was only 16 cents compared to the overall average of 36 cents (which implies kbat the 
avenge size for the tenants paying deposit is 47 cents). Thus, tiley are extremely small 
tenants. 
Ano titer important difference between the two groups of tenants - deposit paying 
and not paying - is that the rents collected from the istter are on an average higher a! 
4330 rupees per acre cu~npared to 3759 rupees per acre for tlie former. Even when the 
alnount is time discounted taking the minlsnum interest charged in the informal credit 
market of d~e  area (24 per ce~it) the renL5 are lsigl~er by about 230 rupees. Although the 
sma!ier teemts do not pity u deposit the rents co11ecked iue higher. 
Two points: need t.a be noted regardir~g the deposit amount. Firstly, it is almost 
equal to the Ellr fcr paddy cultivatiol~ but for the fluctuatio~~s in (he price of paddy. 
Secondly, (he deposit amount as well as the rent on land under banana respond to the 
changes in the price of paddy (or rice). I t  may be observed that the trend in the pice 
of rice is chuactcristd by a sllarp increase ill one or two years followed by a small fnll 
or relative stagnancy. A sharp increase io the price of rice i s  often followed by an 
increase in the deposit and the rent on land under banana. 
6. Conclusion 
Irrigation plays an important role in slislpi~~g tenancy is know~r. This paper has 
shown how. Both the incidence and form of tenascy are governed by the irrigation 
situation and the cllanges therein. ~rrigation uncertainty leads to a lower incidence of 
tenancy and the foni~ itself changes in the direction of dimcropping. In 
understcqnding the terms of co~~tract in the land market a unified treatment of tile Iand 
and labour markets does help a great deal. But its application is limited to the case 
wlie~i the crop cultivated is n subsistence crop, Such a unified treatment is #lot essential 
for the uz~derstanding of land contractq wwilen the crop cultivated is a cash crop. 
[ We are grateful to Dr. Saktlli Padhi, Professors N. Krisllnslji, A. 
Vaidytm:~tha~t, V.C.V. Retnam and G.N. Rao for conlments on aa eartier 
draft of the paper. 1 
N O T E S  
For a m o t  study of literature in tenancy and ~tlated institutions' see Otsuka 
et.al. (1992) and Ossuka and Hayllrn~i (1988). 
See for instance Biudhan (1984). 
CDA WN stands for the Ccnse-Demseoz-AlccIiia11- W i l t i a m s o ~ l  School. 
imperfect infor~l~ation theories are attributed to Akerlof and Stiglitz; 
For a discriptiar~ of I he evolution of irrfgatisa syskcnl in the district see Nair and 
Naray ana (1 990). 
For details regsrdir~g tI?p, i~ae,tlinodsir;agg of thh: survey See Nair and Narayana. 
(i bid.) 
It  way be noted tlli11 K I ~  and Kd i ie otm :lire upper rcnches of two different canals, 
Tlte canal irrigating Kd is very lo:rg and ends in on extremely dry stretch ;md 
it is yossibIe that it1 bad years Kd is also deprived of adequatk water whib 
letling some wiltel- to the tilil cnd. 
Kottalr is a vcilume measure used in this district. Although in t e r n  of 
KiIograrns a liotisl~ o i  paddy varied 74 to 97, we have taken 97 kgs as the 
stn~rdarrl. 
There is an argument that die straw conten? of HYVs is  lower than that of LVg 
and tl~is could be a hclor in the aduption of WYVs. 111 klie sample villages the 
ratio of the value of straw to value of yield was not significnntiplowef in Kn 
compared to KKEI or Pv. 
REFERENCES 
....*....f..*.(ed) (1989) 
Nair, K.N. & Namyana D,(1990) 
Rao, C.H. (1971) 
O b u h  K, & Hayami Y.11988) 
Yoshirnori Momoka and 
Yujiro Hayami (1 989) 
Land b&vur aad Rural hveriv; 
s s a v s  in Develrap~~~ent Economics, 
New York, Columbia University 
Press. 
Economic ??reow of Agrarian 
iitstittrtio~~s. Oxford, Ciarendon Press. 
Irriaation and A~rarian Economic 
Chmnwe in a South Indian I) 
7 Istrict, 
Repofl of a Study sponsored by tllle 
Indian CouneiE uf Sociat Science 
Research. 
Ullcertairaty, Entrepreneurship and 
Slim Cropping in Ifidii~, Jwrl~al of 
Political Economv 79(3), pp.578-596. 
Theories of Sham Tenancy: A Critical 
Survey, Economic Develo~men t and 
Cul tun! Chanp.e 37( k), 3 1-68. 
land and Labour Cot~tmcts in 
Agrarian Economies, Theories and 
Facts, Soun~aF of Economic Literature, 
Deeess.~Exr, pp. 1665-20 1 8. 
The] 
- 
CIarcl~rlcs~ 1 7 s  sss, Oxford. 
Contract Choice and Enforcement in 
2 ~ 1  Agrarian Community: Agricullurd 
Tenancy in Upland Java. Journal of 
Dereloprnent Studies, October 19, 
- 
pp.28-57. 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs  3.0 Licence. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
